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Human Dignity after Augustine’s
Imago Dei: On the Sources and Uses
of Two Ethical Terms
Matthew Puffer

This essay considers how Augustine’s writings on the imago Dei might shed
light on contemporary human dignity discourse and on debates about the
sources, uses, and translations of these two terms. Attending to developments
in Augustine’s expositions of scriptural texts and metaphors related to the imago Dei, I argue that his writings exhibit three distinct conceptions of the imago
Dei that correspond to three accounts of the imago Dei and human dignity
offered by Pico, Luther, and Aquinas, respectively. This plurality of meanings
suggests that appeals to an “Augustinian” understanding of the imago Dei
or human dignity threatens to confuse rather than resolve debates about the
sources and uses of these terms. As long as Augustine remains an influential
voice within the Christian tradition regarding the meaning of the imago Dei, the
question of its translation into the secular idiom of human dignity will remain
a live one because Augustine himself inaugurated quite diverse yet legitimate
modes of interpreting these central tropes.

From Genesis to the Pauline epistles to the hadiths
of Sahih al-Bukhari, the sacred texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam affirm
that human beings were created in the image of God.1 Throughout these traditions’ respective histories, prominent figures such as Maimonides, Thomas
Aquinas, and Ibn Arabi have made the image of God central to questions of
religious thought and life. More recent adherents continue to discuss the image
of God and often treat it as interchangeable with another term that many take
to be its secular analog—namely, human dignity.2
Indeed, today it is the grammar of human dignity more than the language
of the image of God that is in the ascendency. Pope Francis, for example, appeals to the image of God and human dignity almost interchangeably, and
yet he invokes human dignity ten times more frequently than the image of
God both in ecclesial documents and in the public square.3 And it is not only
Matthew Puffer, PhD, is an assistant professor of humanities and ethics in Christ
College at Valparaiso University, Mueller Hall, 1300 Chapel Drive, Valparaiso, IN 46383;
matthew.puffer@valpo.edu.

Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, 37, 1 (2017): 65–82

JSCE_37-1_BOOK.indb 65

6/20/17 12:01 PM

66 • Human Dignity after Augustine’s Imago Dei

religious figures who increasingly deploy this rhetorically powerful language.
“Human dignity” is now ubiquitous in daily speech as well as in legal, political,
and philosophical discourse. From presidential addresses and New York Times
op-eds to the Irish, German, and South African constitutions and International
Criminal Court rulings, “human dignity” has emerged as a key term in the
modern ethical-political vocabulary, raising basic questions about its sources,
uses, and translatability.
Jürgen Habermas, for example, consistently invokes human dignity in recent work on the future of biotechnology—advocating ethical limits on genetic
engineering and enhancement technologies—as well as in explicitly legal and
political arguments surrounding human rights. He argues that “the concept of
‘man in the image of God’ [translates] into that of the identical dignity of all
men that deserves unconditional respect,” and he asserts that this translation of
religious terms into a secular idiom occurs “without emptying them through a
process of deflation and exhaustion.”4 Of course not all philosophers and political theorists share Habermas’s judgments about the image of God, its straightforward translation into human dignity, or its potential for grounding human
rights. Analytic philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, contends that
the “image of God is not adequate . . . for grounding natural human rights.”5 It
might provide a basis for some value, but according to Wolterstorff, the status
of inviolable dignity needed to ground human rights does not derive from the
image of God but from a separate divine conferral of worth. Legal theorist
Jeremy Waldron considers the translation question a bit more complicated. He
recognizes that the image of God, like human dignity, has a long history and
a wide range of meanings: “if [the image of God] is looked to as a ground [for
human rights], [which interpretation we select] may make a considerable difference to the character of the rights theory we erect on its foundation.”6 That
is, depending on what the image of God names, its moral and legal entailments
will vary considerably.
Still other scholars are far less sanguine about the utility of human dignity,
whether for bioethics, human rights, or the public sphere. Ruth Macklin famously argues that “dignity is a useless concept,” and Stephen Pinker similarly
perceives invocations of human dignity as a ploy manifesting the “stupidity”
of cultural “theocons.”7 On the other hand, many Thomists, humanists, Kantians, and legal scholars consider an affirmation of human dignity essential
for precisely those debates in which Macklin and Pinker dismiss it.8 Theorists
and advocates on both sides of a range of contemporary social and political
issues—from abortion, assisted suicide, and genetic experimentation to torture,
immigration policy, and reparations––invoke human dignity to buttress their
respective claims and positions.9 In light of the protean appeal to human dignity
on numerous sides of deeply contested questions, legal scholar Christopher
McCrudden asks: “Does this demonstrate that the concept is hopelessly vague
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and excessively prone to manipulation? Or does the existence of dignity arguments on both sides of controversial debates simply demonstrate the complexity of moral argument?”10 Like McCrudden, larger political institutions are
beginning to wrestle with the questions raised by the multiplicity of sources
and uses of human dignity. Signaling its importance for understanding our
world today, the US President’s Council on Bioethics, the British Academy,
and the Union Académique Internationale have recently commissioned conferences and published volumes on the question of human dignity, consulting
scholars and practitioners across diverse fields and disciplines.11 Sociologists of
religion from Emile Durkheim to Mary Douglas, Peter Berger, and Hans Joas
remind us that it is contestations such as these surrounding the genesis and
ends of human dignity that disclose just what a culture constructs as the sacred,
demarcating the boundaries and essence of the human condition. Everyone
cares about human dignity today, even if we mean different things and we care
in different ways.
On a more quotidian level, the manifest disagreements about what human
dignity entails raise questions about the extent to which theorists who invoke
human dignity are talking about the same thing. Most often, invocations of
human dignity resemble one of three philosophical conceptions. Some turn to
ancient antecedents—e.g., Aristotle, Seneca, or Cicero—for whom semnotes or
dignitas has to do with virtue, self-regulation, or the conferral of and respect
for an honorable social status.12 Many others invoke Kant’s Menschenwürde, the
inviolable worth derivative of the special human capacity for self-legislation
(Autonomie) in accordance with reason.13 Most often, however, the meaning
resembles John Stuart Mill’s more liberal construal of autonomy, the liberty to
act in accordance with a life plan one chooses for oneself.14 The contemporary
deprivatization of religion further muddies the waters as appeals to these three
different meanings of dignity overlap to varying degrees with concepts from
diverse religious and cultural traditions—like the image of God, Islamic conceptions of fitra, or South African notions of ubuntu.15 It is hardly surprising,
then, that the meaning of human dignity in present-day religious, philosophical, and legal discourses varies greatly depending upon who appeals to it and
the purposes to which they put it.
In response to this manifest diversity of concerns and meanings, this essay
seeks both to further complicate and to clarify the various interpretative issues
surrounding historical understandings of the image of God and human dignity.
I illumine the uses and translations of these terms by showing that several
meanings were already present in one influential source of ethical thought and
by tracing their development. For much of Latin Christendom—from Boethius
and Aquinas to Martin Luther and Jonathan Edwards—Augustine of Hippo was
an, if not the, authoritative voice, second only to their sacred scriptures. And,
in many debates that have shaped Roman Catholic and Protestant thought,
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much has depended on which side could most persuasively claim Augustine’s
authoritative legacy. With an eye toward assessing Augustine’s influence upon
later rival interpretations of the image of God and human dignity, this essay
offers a fine-grained account of developments within Augustine’s own scriptural exegesis, highlighting three distinct interpretations of the image of God
that are evident as his understanding evolves throughout his writings. This
account complicates appeals to a single purported “Augustinian” conception
of the image of God by disclosing not one meaning but three. Thus, the story
I tell about the image of God in Augustine’s thought in no way resolves, but
rather anticipates and mirrors, debates about the sources and uses of human
dignity that emerged in the earlier modern period and echo even more today.
Instead, my account clarifies how each of three prevalent, competing meanings
of human dignity finds its theological analog in a version of the image of God
already present in Augustine’s writings. Therefore, I argue, as long as Augustine
remains an influential voice within the Christian tradition regarding the meaning of the image of God, the question of its translation into the secular idiom
of human dignity will remain a live one.

Three Versions of the Imago Dei in Augustine’s Writings
Much of Augustine’s Confessions is devoted to disavowing Manichaean understandings of evil, the image of God, and justice.16 In Book 6 he confesses that,
at the time of his conversion from Manichaeism to Christianity in 386 CE, the
bishop of Milan, Ambrose, was preaching on a longstanding interest of Augustine’s, the image of God.17 As a Manichean “hearer,” Augustine learned from
fellow followers of Mani that the Hebrew Bible embraced by Christians as the
Old Testament included in it absurd doctrines, including the ascription to God
of a human form. This, Mani said, was the implication of Genesis 1:26–27: “Let
us make humankind to our image, according to our likeness. . . . So, God created humankind to his image, to the image of God he created them, male and
female he created them.” As a Manichee, Augustine had learned not to trust
the Hebrew Bible for numerous reasons, and the ascription of a human form
to God was paramount. After his exposure to the Alexandrian Neoplatonism of
Ambrose and his conversion from North African Manichaean Christianity to
Catholic Christianity, however, Augustine’s vigorous affirmation of the image
of God became a central point of contention in the new convert’s polemical
interactions with Manichaean elites such as Faustus. Subsequently, interpretations of scriptural references to the image of God became an enduring interest that slowly deepened over the next four and a half decades of Augustine’s
teaching, preaching, and writing, including five major expositions of Genesis 1
in particular.18 In the end, more than eight hundred explicit references to the
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image and likeness of God would be inscribed across more than 150 of Augustine’s letters, sermons, and treatises.19
Three distinct conceptions of the image of God emerge in three successive
periods of Augustine’s forty-five-year writing career. In Augustine’s early writings (386–400 CE), he presents the image of God as something extrinsic to
the human, as the Son who is the proper object of human love. In the middle
writings (401–412 CE), he re-presents the image of God as something intrinsic
but not inherent to the human, as a natural capacity for loving God that can
be lost and regained. In his later writings (413–430 CE), Augustine eventually
comes to see the image of God as an intrinsic and inherent capacity for loving
God that is persistent and nonadventitious to human nature. In what follows,
I show how these three distinct meanings that Augustine gives to the image of
God slowly emerge out of a practice of continual revision in his theological
exegesis of scripture.
As Augustine explains to Marcellinus—the Roman official and friend to
whom Augustine dedicated his magnum opus, The City of God—“I write as I
develop, and I develop as I write.”20 Through careful attention to developments
in his writings about the image of God, I demonstrate how the initial conception of the image of God evident in Augustine’s early writings gradually evolves
into the quite distinct understandings presented in the middle and later writings. More specifically, subsequent to Augustine’s early interpretive framework,
I argue that seven developments in Augustine’s theological exegesis of specific
scriptural texts and metaphors account for the distinct accounts of the image
of God in the middle and later writings.

Augustine’s Early Interpretive Framework
Three features of Augustine’s early moral reasoning provide a useful background against which subsequent developments can be cast in sharp relief.
First, Augustine’s initial interpretations of the image of God owe much to the
preposition “to” (ad) in the Genesis 1:26–27 text, “God created humankind to
the image and likeness of God” (ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei).21 From his
first writings in 386 CE until Book 13 of the Confessions (c. 400 CE), Augustine
repeatedly emphasizes that human beings are created with a particular relation
to the image of God. He does not assert that the human person is the image
of God, or even that humans are created in the image of God. Rather, the
human is created toward the image of God. The image of God is an extrinsic
telos toward which the human agent orients his or her love. His consistent
emphasis in these writings is that human beings were created with a disposition
or orientation toward the image of God, where the image and likeness of God
is understood to be the second person of the Trinity, the Son of God, consubstantial with and coequal to the Father. It is the Son, qua image of God, toward
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whom the human was oriented, dispositionally, in creation. Augustine learned
this interpretation of Genesis 1:26 from Ambrose, who synthesized New Testament texts that proclaim that Jesus Christ is the image of God (Col 1:15 and 2
Cor 4:4) with a virtue-framed conception of the progressive renewal of human
nature toward God’s image. In this early period of Augustine’s development, he
too frames the moral progress made by an individual believer in the grammar
of Neoplatonic ascent, allowing, at least for a time, for the retention of residual
Manichean commitments regarding the attainability of perfection in this life.
For roughly the first decade after his conversion to Catholic Christianity—
five years as a layperson and five as a priest in the North African town of Hippo
Regius—Augustine remained convinced that those who follow a truly virtuous
way of life attain moral perfection in this life.22 In such early works as On the
Morals of the Catholic Church (387–89 CE), On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees (389 CE), and On the Sermon on the Mount (393 CE), this notion of progress [profectus] is signified figurally by seven steps that correspond to seven days
of creation and to seven beatitudes (where an eighth day or beatitude represents
an octave, or a reprise of the first). Those who are carried upward by their ever
more rightly ordered love for the Son, the image of God, find their corrupt
natures are healed and their virtues are strengthened, giving them ever greater
victory and control over the fallen and rebellious concupiscent libido. In these
texts and many others from this early period, Augustine presents the moral
life in terms of two possible trajectories. Depending on the willing orientation
of one’s love toward the object(s) of its enjoyment, one is either ascending or
descending in one’s nature, knowledge, and love.
Second, during this early period, Augustine repeatedly interprets these two
trajectories in terms of three metaphorical distinctions that he finds in Pauline texts that refer to the image of God—the “old human / new human” of
Colossians 3 and Ephesians 4; the “image of the earthly human / image of
the heavenly human” of 1 Corinthians 15; and the “outer human / inner human” of 2 Corinthians 4. The synthesis of these three metaphorical distinctions is not peculiar to Augustine. In fact, it replicates the exegesis of Faustus,
the Manichean Elect (or perfecti) with whom Augustine became quite familiar
during the formative decade that Augustine lived as a “zealous [Manichean]
hearer.”23 Faustus writes, “For according to the Apostle there are two men, one
of whom he sometimes calls the outer man, generally the earthly, sometimes
too the old man; the other he calls the inner or heavenly or new man.”24 Like
Faustus’s Paul, Augustine’s synthesis of the old/new, outer/inner, and earthly/
heavenly distinctions indexes a single dichotomy, but influenced as he is by the
Neoplatonism of Ambrose and others in Milan, it is a binary not so much of
knowledge as of will; not gnosis, but orientation or disposition. Thus, all three
scriptural metaphorical distinctions signify the same twofold possibility regarding one’s ascending or descending trajectory, with the choice dependent on
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one’s disposition, the voluntary orientation of one’s love. The weight of rightly
ordered love of God and all things in God—including both higher goods (i.e.,
invisible, intelligible, eternal, immutable, incorporeal goods) as well as lower
ones (i.e., visible, sensible, temporal, mutable, corporeal goods)—carries one
toward God, an ascent, whereas the disordered love for lower goods carries one
away from God, a descent.
Third, Augustine’s exposition of the four stages of humanity in his 395 CE
Romans commentaries perceives in Paul a soteriological framework that ef
fectively displaces the earlier, more libertarian conception in which persons
freely choose whether to ascend the seven gradual steps of virtuous perfection.
Augustine now interprets Paul as providing a four-stage framework: (1) before
the law (ante legem), (2) under the law (sub lege), (3) under grace (sub gratia), and
(4) in peace (in pace).25 These four stages are separated by moments of instantaneous transition and transformation—stage one ends with the giving of the law,
regeneration marks the transition from stage two to stage three, and the general
resurrection of the dead ushers in the eternal peace of stage four. Within this
newly discovered framework, the renewal or renovation toward the image of
God, previously spread across seven gradual steps of ascent, becomes confined
to the third stage of human existence sub gratia, where only the regenerate elect
have the capacity to resist the concupiscent libido. Most significant for our purposes, the four-stage framework introduces new interpretive possibilities both
for the image of God and for the metaphorical distinctions that Augustine, under
the residual influence of Faustus, had previously collapsed into two orientations
of the human will.
With these three features of Augustine’s early thought in view—(1) the image of God identifies the Son toward whom the human is oriented; (2) the
old/new, outer/inner, and earthly/heavenly scriptural metaphorical distinctions
refer to two orientations of will; and (3) the reframing of salvation history from
seven gradual steps to four distinct stages—we are better positioned to appreciate a series of subsequent developments in Augustine’s understanding of the
image of God.

Seven Developments in Augustine’s Scriptural Imagination
Gerald Bonner once wrote of Augustine, “It is reasonable to regard his opinions on most theological issues as having been established by the time he
became sole bishop of Hippo in 396.”26 On the contrary, through careful attention to Augustine’s theological exegesis, I demonstrate seven developments
in Augustine’s evolving understanding of the image of God, all of which occur
after 396 CE. Earlier, I argued that Augustine’s early writings (386–400 CE)
depict the image of God as an extrinsic telos—the image of God is the Son of
God toward whom human dispositions were rightly oriented in creation and
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toward whom fallen human beings ought to reorient their loves. In what follows, I examine Augustine’s writings from 400–430 CE, with special attention
to several developments in his interpretive judgments about scriptural texts
and metaphors, including the meaning of the image of God and whether this
image might be lost.
First, around 400 CE, after two abandoned commentaries on Genesis, Augustine makes two important revisions that anticipate and precipitate additional related changes. These two developments are apparent in his exegesis of
Genesis 1 and 1 Corinthians 11:7 in Confessions and in On the Works of Monks,
respectively. Augustine’s third exposition of Genesis 1:26–27 in just over a decade, Book 13 of the Confessions reconsiders the implications where the human
is said to be created “to our image” and “according to our likeness.” Augustine’s
first exegesis that attends to the plural pronouns coincides with a new judgment
that the “ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei” refers to the Trinity rather than
solely to the Son. Hereafter, Augustine no longer contends that human beings
are created with a disposition toward the Son—where the Son is understood
as the perfect image and likeness of the Father. Instead we read that human
beings are created toward the image of the Trinity.27 Arriving only in the final
few pages of Confessions, what this will come to mean for Augustine is anything
but clear at this point.
Within a year of concluding his Confessions, Augustine wrestles for the first of
many times with the apparent, literal, and spiritual meanings of 1 Corinthians
11:7. In On the Works of Monks (401 CE), Augustine first quotes this text—man
is the image and glory of God but woman is the glory of man—and he does so
as a warrant for a second important revision. 1 Corinthians 11:7 is important
to Augustine because it is the one scriptural text that explicitly states that a human being is the image of God (or, rather, it is the only text that does so that
is not also explicitly referencing Jesus Christ). At the same time, however, it
attributes the image of God to the male as opposed to the female human being.
Here, Augustine claims for the first time not that the human being is created
toward the image of God (ad imaginem Dei), but rather that the human being is
the image of God (est imago Dei).28
Prior to around 400 CE, Augustine had interpreted Genesis 1, Colossians 3,
Ephesians 4, 1 Corinthians 15, Romans 8, and 2 Corinthians 4 within a reading
that affirmed the Son is the image of God—the image toward whom the human
was oriented in creation. After 400 CE—when his exegesis of 1 Corinthians
11:7 coincides with the Trinitarian rendering of Genesis 1:26–27—Augustine
consistently affirms that the individual human being is the image of God, albeit
still only with respect to the rational part of the human soul. Augustine’s interpretation of the image of God shifts at this point, from an image of God signifying an extrinsic telos toward which the human being was created and toward
which the human progresses, to an intrinsic referent within the human itself.
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Subsequent developments manifest a continuing evolution from 401–412
CE. By arguing that the human being is the image of the Trinity, Augustine
creates new difficulties when it comes to sustaining his earlier interpretive
decisions regarding other texts, particularly those that invoke the term “image” in relation to the Son. For example, in a third revision, Augustine
reinterprets “conformed to the image of his Son” (Rom 8:29). No longer
is this a reference to moral progress through virtuous renewal in this life.
Rather, he asserts that the image of the Son here references the resurrected
spiritual body, a referent that comes to be shared with the “image of the
heavenly human” of 1 Corinthians 15:49. Recall that previously, in On the
Morals of the Catholic Church, being “conformed to the image of the Son”
and the “image of the heavenly human” had been considered synonymous
with the “new human” of Colossians 3 and Ephesians 4 and with the “inner
human” of 2 Corinthians 4.
Both of the latter metaphors come to be reinterpreted as well. A fourth
revision involves relocating the “old human / new human” of Colossians 3 and
Ephesians 4 from its prior referent, a binary of concupiscent descent or virtuous
ascent, to a new referent—namely, the moment of regeneration or conversion,
from sub lege to sub gratia, in Augustine’s four-stage framework. A fifth revision mirrors this development when Augustine relocates the “earthly human /
heavenly human” distinction of 1 Corinthians 15:49 from its prior referent—
the same dichotomy of descent or ascent—to the moment of transition from
this life to the next, from sub gratia to in pace. Collectively, these developments
serve to disaggregate the three metaphorical distinctions that Augustine had
previously synthesized. The “old human / new human” and “earthly human /
heavenly human” metaphors now index regeneration and resurrection, respectively—two distinct transitions in the four stages of humanity.
Augustine’s sixth significant revision emerges out of his exegesis of 2 Corinthians 3 in On the Spirit and the Letter (412–413 CE) and has to do with the
large question of whether or not the image of God is lost in the Fall. In his
early works, from 386 to 400 CE, Augustine was able to write of a lost disposition. For example, in Against Adimantus (396 CE) Augustine is quite clear that
the disposition toward the image and likeness of God, one’s orientation to the
Son, can be lost. But where the image of God remained an extrinsic telos, the
meaning of losing the image of God was more akin to losing one’s way than to
losing something intrinsic. From 400 to 412 CE, in the years he composes The
Literal Meaning of Genesis, all of this changes, and it is in this period and in this
text more than any other that we find Augustine’s strongest and most repeated
assertions that the image of God is indeed lost in the Fall and only restored in
regeneration.29 After the Fall and before regeneration, sub lege, the image of
God is not only deformed or tarnished but destroyed. The image of God is thus
totally lost for unregenerate humanity.
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But this stark conviction soon comes under further scrutiny and revision.
Augustine first entertains an alternative hypothesis—that the image of God
might not be lost in the Fall—somewhat tentatively in an exegesis of 2 Corinthians 3 in On the Spirit and the Letter. There the concern is Paul’s discussion
of the law of Moses in relation to God’s covering and lifting of the veil. In the
same year, in 413 CE, Sermon 362 and Letters 147 and 148 all return to this
passage from Paul, arguing that the “image transformed from glory to glory”
(2 Cor 3:18) is not a recovery of what was lost but an uncovering of that which
had been veiled. From this point forward in Augustine’s writings, including his
final Retractiones, Augustine cites 2 Corinthians 3:18 as a warrant for this revised
interpretation—the image of God is not lost in the Fall.30
The most significant implication of this sixth revision, the new conviction
that the image of God is not lost but only veiled, is that it leads to identifying
the image of God with an inherent, persistent capacity for the contemplation
of God. This capacity of the rational soul, Augustine tells us, persists even in
those for whom this capacity is not empowered or activated by the divine grace
and love of the Holy Spirit. Three times in De trinitate 14, Augustine repeats
that the image of God is this capacity in human nature for participation in God
as opposed to the active participation itself.31 The capacity is intrinsic to and
inherent in human nature such that it is not lost even when this capacity is not
activated, not operationalized by God’s love as the Holy Spirit. Thus, the old,
unregenerate, sub lege human (of Col 3 and Eph 4) is just as much the image of
God as is the new, regenerate, sub gratia human. The image of God is no longer
something extrinsic to the human toward which it is oriented, as it was from
386-400 CE; nor is the image of God something lost in the Fall and restored
only to those who are reformed or remade as God’s image by regeneration and
the mind’s inspiration, as it was from 401–412 CE. Rather, after 413 CE the
image of God is persistently present in the nature of the rational soul itself as an
intrinsic capacity, regardless of whether the soul willingly exercises this capacity
and participates in the divine self-love.
In a seventh revision Augustine returns to 1 Corinthians 11:7—man is the
image and glory of God but woman is the glory of man—a provocative text
that apparently excludes the female from reflecting the divine image. As noted
earlier, Augustine’s figural reading of 1 Corinthians 11:7 interprets the male
and female as signifying two parts of the one human. The development worth
highlighting here is more of a series of revisions with a trajectory as opposed to
a single development. Initially, Augustine takes the male to signify the mind and
the female to signify all that is concupiscent in human nature—the normative
implication being that the male is to exercise dominion over the female, just as
the rational soul exercises dominion over its irrational elements and the body,
as the human does over the nonrational animal and as Christ does over the
Church.32 Augustine’s second reading promotes the female from signifying all
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of the concupiscent elements in human nature, including the material body, to
signifying only the nonrational parts of the soul, thereby excluding the physical
body.33 Instead, the serpent takes over that lowest signifying function previously assigned to the female. In a third reading, Augustine yet again relocates
the distinction of 1 Corinthians 11:7 so that both male and female signify the
mind—the inner human (of the inner/outer distinction from 2 Corinthians 4)—
but in such a way that only the male signifies the mind’s contemplation of
wisdom whereas the female signifies the mind’s active knowledge that manages
temporal things.34 As such, the female in 1 Corinthians 11:7 no longer signifies
the nonrational part of the soul held in common with the beasts but rather an
aspect of the rational portion of the soul considered unique to the human, albeit
a decisively subordinate aspect.35

Human Dignity after Augustine’s Imago Dei
The developments mapped in the foregoing present a gradual unfolding in
Augustine’s interpretation of the image of God. Scriptural distinctions and
metaphors that initially overlap in a single, simpler conception of the moral
life eventually fold outward and migrate, taking on different meanings within a
larger four-stage soteriological framework. The unfolding starts from a vision
of the image of God in which all of the texts initially considered were located
within a framework of virtuous ascent toward perfection: The ad imaginem et
similitudinem (of Gen 1), the “image of the heavenly human” (of 1 Cor 15), and
being “conformed to the image of the Son” (of Rom 8) all refer to the telos
toward which the rightly ordered rational soul is oriented. Here, the image of
God is extrinsic to the human—the Son is the image of God toward which the
human disposition aims, to which human love conforms itself, and to which
the weight of its love carries it. Within this framework of virtuous ascent, Augustine renders several of scripture’s metaphorical distinctions in terms of two
potential dispositions of will. From old to new (Eph 4, Col 3), from earthly
to heavenly (1 Cor 15), from outer to inner (2 Cor 4)—a reorientation of will
distinguishes those who remain enslaved to concupiscence from those who are
making progress on the path of a gradual perfection, a perfection attainable in
this life through the pursuit of the moral life of which the Catholic Christian
faith is the chief exponent.
Gradually, Augustine revisits the scriptural texts’ distinctions between old and
new, outer and inner, earthly and heavenly, and all begin to unfold outward onto
a larger framework. The scriptural “old human / new human” distinction (Col 3
and Eph 4) and the “earthly human / heavenly human” distinction (1 Cor 15) no
longer reference a gradual growth but now index, instead, two different instantaneous transitions: regeneration and resurrection. As the various texts unfold, they
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disclose not one image of God but two. First, the image of the Trinity refers to a
capacity of the mind that persists across all four stages of human existence. Thus,
the image of God is no longer a telos toward which one progresses, nor is it lost
in the Fall. Second, the “image of the Son” (Rom 8:29), having been displaced
from its prior identification with Genesis 1:26, comes to reference the spiritual
body of the resurrection that only the elect will inherit in pace.
Developments in Augustine’s theological exegesis of the image of God afford a new vantage from which to offer a few critical observations about the
uses of the language of human dignity in relation to the imago Dei. I noted at
the outset both the variety of sources and diversity of meanings operative in
human dignity discourse—e.g., Seneca, Kant, and Mill—and also several competing judgments regarding the translatability of the image of God into the
language of human dignity—e.g., Habermas, Wolterstorff, and Waldron. The
three different interpretations of the image of God evident in three periods
of Augustine’s writings—first, an extrinsic telos; second, something intrinsic
that can be lost; and, third, an intrinsic capacity that persists—allow for a more
complex assessment of the uses of these terms. Given the variety of interpretations of both human dignity and the image of God, we must judge Habermas’s
claim to be ill-informed—the image of God does not simply translate directly as
human dignity without loss or remainder. Waldron is nearer to the mark. Any
translation of the image of God as human dignity will need to specify which
meaning of each term that one has in view. As long as invocations of the image
of God and human dignity leave the diverse historical sources and meanings of
these terms unspecified, they will fall victim to the critiques rightly advanced
by Macklin, Pinker, and others.
At the same time, labeling a particular account of the image of God “Augustinian” does little to specify which account of human dignity one has in view.
Consider, for example, three major heirs of Augustine’s legacy in the Medieval
and Reformation periods who respectively exhibit Augustine’s three interpretations of the image of God with quite different implications for the meaning
of human dignity. Augustine’s first interpretation finds an analog in the Italian
Renaissance humanist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola; his second, in the onetime Augustinian priest, Martin Luther; and his third, in the great Medieval
synthesizer of Augustine and Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas. These figures reflect
different strands of Augustine’s legacy in interesting and complicated ways.
In his “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” Pico shows that he, like the early
Augustine, drank deeply from the casks of Neoplatonic thought: “Let us disdain
things of earth . . . putting behind us all the things of this world, hasten to that
court beyond the world, closest to the most exalted Godhead. . . . Let us emulate their dignity and glory. And, if we will it, we shall be inferior to them in
nothing. . . . If we burn with love for the Creator only, his consuming fire will
quickly transform us into the flaming likeness of the Seraphim.”36 The dignity
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of man for Pico is thus not something intrinsic but a particularly high—indeed,
god-like—rank or status to which humans may aspire. What is unique about
human beings is not that they have this dignity but that through the liberal arts
they are capable of striving toward and eventually attaining its likeness. In this
respect, the “dignity” spoken of in Pico’s “Oration” is analogous to the image
of God in Augustine’s early writings from 386 to 400 CE. It is not what we are
by nature or something we inherently possess but rather a task, an aspiration,
an image into which we as indeterminate beings strive to make ourselves.
In his 1535 Lectures on Genesis, Martin Luther mirrors Augustine’s second
account of the image of God as intrinsic but not inherent, as something lost but
potentially restored. This is hardly surprising given Luther’s indebtedness to Augustine’s The Literal Meaning of Genesis (401–412 CE), in which this interpretation is most pronounced. Correlating dignity to the image of God, Luther writes,
Attention should therefore be given to the text before us in which the Holy
Spirit dignifies the nature of man in such a glorious manner . . . made according to the image and likeness of God. . . . What is that image of God? . . .
Augustine has much to say in his explanation of this passage, particularly in
his book On the Trinity. Moreover, the remaining doctors in general follow
Augustine . . . they contribute very little toward the correct explanation of
the image of God. . . . I am not sure that they are very useful. . . . I am afraid
that since the loss of this image through sin we cannot understand it to any
effect. . . . We cannot have an adequate knowledge of what that image of God
was which was lost through sin in Paradise.37

According to Luther, the “image and likeness of God” of Genesis 1 indexes
the peculiar dignity of pre-Fallen human nature. Rejecting the later exposition in De trinitate, wherein Augustine argues that the image of God is never
lost, Luther favors an interpretation consonant with The Literal Meaning of
Genesis—the image of God was intrinsic to the human as created but was lost
through sin. It is not difficult to see how this conception of the image of God
corresponds to less stable notions of human dignity in which even basic rights
might be forfeited or lost by an individual’s sin or gross violations of justice.
If human dignity grounds rights to life, liberty, freedom of religion, and the
prohibition of torture, but a guilty verdict (e.g., in cases of first-degree murder,
crimes against humanity, or treason) might forfeit or invalidate such rights,
this corresponds to a view that human dignity might be intrinsic to those who
possess it but does not inhere for those who violate some moral obligation. In
this account, human dignity is not inalienable or absolute; like the image of
God, it can be lost.
Aquinas’s account of the image of God corresponds to Augustine’s later
interpretation advanced in De trinitate. Aquinas argues that the image of God
in the human is the rational soul’s natural capacity for judgment, choice, and
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action in accordance with that choice. According to Thomist ethicist Jean Porter, this account explains why “torture is an assault on human dignity” and
ought, for this reason, to be absolutely prohibited: “The good of the soul, the
integrity of the image of God within the individual, his or her capacities for
faith, hope, and love—no considerations of personal or national security, nor
even the possibility of widespread loss of life, can justify an assault on these.”38
Torture is thus a violation of human dignity because it attempts to undermine
an agent’s rational judgment, choice, and action, no matter the moral state of
the accused—it assaults the very capacity that is the image of God.39
Pico, Luther, and Thomas therefore present three rival versions of human
dignity that correspond to distinct interpretations of the image of God, each
with an antecedent in one of three periods of Augustine’s writing career. Although each figure inherits a different interpretation of the image of God, each
has a legitimate claim to the “Augustinian” moniker. Similarly, the interpretive
development within Augustine’s writings on the image of God suggests that a
posture of critical openness is appropriate for “Augustinians” of various stripes
today. Furthermore, Augustine’s praxis of critical engagement with his sacred
texts presents an opportunity where contemporary translations of the image
of God into the grammar of human dignity are concerned. Namely, we might
anticipate developments beyond Augustine in contemporary understandings of
human dignity where Jews, Christians, or Muslims take into consideration texts
highlighting ethical or theological facets of the image of God that Augustine
elides—e.g., Genesis 9.6, Colossians 1:15, and 2 Corinthians 4:4. Augustine’s
own evolution in conversation with his scriptures suggests that he would welcome critical reassessment of his own writings in light of such texts.
Regarding such developments, a letter to Hillary in 427 CE, near the end of
Augustine’s life, is instructive for the remarkable self-awareness it exhibits: “I
should wish no one to embrace all of my teaching. . . . I have not always held
to the same views. Rather I believe I developed . . . while writing. We can have
good hope for someone if the last day of this life finds him still developing.”40
Augustine exhorted his parishioners likewise to “always develop” (semper profice).41 As Christian ethicists today develop critical and constructive accounts
of the sources and uses of human dignity, we have much to learn from the ways
that contemporary moral discourse continues to fashion human dignity after
Augustine’s imago Dei.
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